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Abstract. We apply path-integral techniques to study the dynamics of agent-based
models with asymmetric information structures. In particular, we devise a batch
version of a model proposed originally by Berg et al. [1], and convert the coupled
multi-agent processes into an effective-agent problem from which the dynamical order
parameters in ergodic regimes can be derived self-consistently together with the
corresponding phase structure. Our dynamical study complements and extends the
available static theory. Results are confirmed by numerical simulations.
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1. Introduction
Over the past years the study of agent-based models of financial markets or other
phenomena with the tools of statistical mechanics has proved to be exceptionally fruitful.
Many such models can, in the language of statistical mechanics, be understood as fully
connected mean-field systems comprising disordered interactions and various types of
global frustration. They are thus perfectly suited to be addressed with the techniques
developed originally for other purposes, such as the study of magnetic systems, spin-
glasses or neural networks. Indeed, both static and dynamical methods, including replica
techniques and path integrals, have been successfully applied for example to the Minority
Game (MG) [2], presumably one of the most studied models in this context, and have
led to an advanced theoretical understanding of the behaviour of various versions of the
MG [3–5]. On the other hand these studies have also revealed new types of complexity
and phase transitions, which hitherto had been unknown to statistical physicists.
The standard versions of the MG describe an ensemble of interacting agents who at
each time step react to publicly available information by taking trading decisions, e.g.
to buy or to sell a given asset. While it is crucial in this setting that the information
made available is identical for all agents, no interaction between the individual traders
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other than through this global and uniform signal is present in the MG. Furthermore,
it is essentially of little relevance whether this stream of information is generated
endogenously by the system or drawn externally at random [6] as long as all agents
react to the same signal. This suffices to generate a remarkably complex dynamics with
phenomena including phase transitions, non-ergodic regimes, replica symmetry breaking
and memory effects .
The aim of the present paper is to extend the dynamical path-integral formalism
to the study of models with private, agent-dependent information. These cases play a
major role in economic theory, especially in view of the connection between asymmetric
information and the failure of market equilibrium [7]. The model we address here
was first introduced in [1] and is a close relative of the Shapley-Shubik model of non-
cooperative trading equilibrium [8]. While the focus of [1] lies mainly on the statics of
the model using replica techniques, we will here complement this work by an analysis
of the dynamics based on generating functionals for systems with quenched disorder [9].
Although the dynamical analysis presented here parallels that of the MG, the model
displays some novel features and new types of phases. Our analysis sets the stage for
further studies addressing subtle issues related to fluctuations and dependence on the
learning rate, inherently dynamical features which statics is unable to capture. In the
present paper we will mostly be concerned with the mathematical analysis of the model,
details of the economic background can be found in [1] and references therein.
2. Model definitions
The definition of the model follows closely that given in [1]. One considers a single-asset
market with N agents labelled by Roman indices. It is assumed that the asset pays
a monetary return R(ℓ) at the end of each market round ℓ = 0, 1, 2, . . .. This return
depends on the value of a discrete variable ω(ℓ), which models the “state of the world”
and is similar to the global signal made available to agents in MGs. We will here assume
that ω(ℓ) is determined externally, similar to MGs with randomly drawn exogenous
information. Specifically, ω(ℓ) is selected randomly and independently at each round
with flat probability distribution from the set {1, . . . ,Ω}. The statistical mechanics
analysis will ultimately be concerned with the thermodynamic limit N → ∞, which
is taken in a way such that the relative number of possible states of the world Ω/N
remains finite. The ratio α = Ω/N turns out to be the key control parameter of the
model. The asset return at time ℓ is then given as R(ℓ) = Rω(ℓ), where the components
of the vector R = (R1, . . . , RΩ) are taken to be quenched random variables, drawn at
the start of the game and then kept fixed. It is assumed that they each take the form
Rω = R +
R˜ω√
N
, (1)
where R > 0 is a constant, and where the {R˜ω} are independent, identically distributed
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance λ2 > 0. Thus, the Bernoulli
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process {ω(ℓ)}ℓ≥0 induces the time series of asset returns {R(ℓ) ≡ Rω(ℓ)}ℓ≥0. R and λ
are additional model parameters. The motivation for the choice (1) will become clear
in the following.
Contrary to MGs, traders in this model are unable to observe the state ω(ℓ) directly.
Rather, each of them has access only to a coarse-grained signal on {1, . . . ,Ω} which
corresponds to some fixed private information scheme. In particular, the signal observed
by a given trader i is determined by the vector
ki : {1, . . . ,Ω} ∋ ω → kωi ∈ {−1, 1}. (2)
The components of any ki (i = 1, . . . , N) are again assumed to be drawn at random and
independently from {−1, 1} with equal probability for all i and ω at the beginning of the
game and are kept fixed afterwards. In this way, each trader has a private information
source providing him with a binary signal k
ω(ℓ)
i at time ℓ. This private signal does
depend on the state ω(ℓ), but exactly what this state is at time ℓ is not known to the
individual agents. Since the {Rω} and the {ki} are drawn independently, the sequence
{kω(ℓ)i }ℓ≥0 observed by agent i will in general not allow him to tell what return Rω(ℓ) is
to be expected at time step ℓ. Crucially, however, the correlation between the vectors
ki and R are heterogeneous across the population of traders, so that different agents
will have varying abilities to resolve the individual states ω ∈ {1, . . . ,Ω}.
At each round ℓ of the game every agent decides to invest a monetary amount
z
ik
ω(ℓ)
i
(ℓ) ≥ 0 which depends on the signal kω(ℓ)i ∈ {−1, 1} he receives at stage ℓ. The
total amount invested by agents at round ℓ determines the price of the asset:
p(ℓ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
σ∈{−1,1}
ziσ(ℓ)δσ,kω(ℓ)
i
. (3)
It remains to specify how the agents determine the amounts {ziσ(ℓ)} they invest. It is
assumed that traders are adaptive and that their behaviour is governed by an inductive
learning dynamics. Specifically, each agent has a propensity uiσ(ℓ) to invest under each
of the two possible signals σ ∈ {−1, 1}; these propensities are initialized at values uiσ(0)
at time t = 0 and are updated at the end of every round according to the marginal
success of the investment:
uiσ(ℓ+ 1) = uiσ(ℓ) + Γ
∂Qi(ℓ)
∂ziσ(ℓ)
. (4)
Here Γ > 0 is a learning rate‡, while Qi(ℓ) stands for the payoff received by trader i
at the end of round ℓ. The {Qi(ℓ)} can be specified upon noting that at each round
every agent puts forward his bid before p(ℓ) is known and makes profit if the return of
the asset exceeds its price. The price in turn is determined by the collective action of
all traders, Eq. (3). Now since agent i acquires z
i,k
ω(ℓ)
i
(ℓ)/p(ℓ) units of the asset, each
‡ In principle, different agents i might have different learning rates Γi. We here restrict the discussion
to the case Γi ≡ Γ for all i. Our theory can be generalised to populations of agents with heterogeneous
learning rates.
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yielding an effective return of R(ℓ)−p(ℓ), the following form for the payoffs is assumed:
Qi(ℓ) =
ziσ(ℓ)
p(ℓ)
[R(ℓ)− p(ℓ)] δ
σ,k
ω(ℓ)
i
. (5)
For simplicity, we linearise the payoff as in [1] and consider
Qi(ℓ) = ziσ(ℓ) [R(ℓ)− p(ℓ)] δσ,kω(ℓ)
i
. (6)
To compute the marginal payoffs ∂Qi(ℓ)
∂ziσ(ℓ)
, note that p(ℓ) is itself a function of ziσ(ℓ), so
that in principle one has
∂Qi(ℓ)
∂ziσ(ℓ)
= [R(ℓ)− p(ℓ)] δ
σ,k
ω(ℓ)
i
− ziσ(ℓ) ∂p(ℓ)
∂ziσ(ℓ)
δ
σ,k
ω(ℓ)
i
. (7)
In general, traders may not be able to evaluate how much their decision affects the price,
i.e. na¨ıve agents who neglect the impact of their own trading action might ignore the
second term on the right-hand side, while other so-called sophisticated agents [10] might
be able to take into account this market-impact correction. We will not allow for any
heterogeneity across the agents in this respect, but will instead study the dynamics
uiσ(ℓ+ 1) = uiσ(ℓ) + Γδσ,kω(ℓ)
i
[
R(ℓ)− p(ℓ)− η
N
ziσ(ℓ)
]
. (8)
Here η ≥ 0 is a further model parameter which accounts for the (uniform) ability of the
agents to estimate the impact of their trading actions on the price. For η = 0 agents act
as ‘price takers’ and neglect the effect of the term ∂p(ℓ)
∂ziσ(ℓ)
when updating the propensities;
on the other hand for η = 1 they fully correct for their impact on the price process.
Tuning η ∈ [0, 1] allows to consider agents of increasing sophistication, similar to what
is done in MGs with market-impact correction. Finally, the propensities {uiσ(ℓ)} are
related to the investments {ziσ(ℓ)} made at time step ℓ via
ziσ(ℓ) = uiσ(ℓ)θ[uiσ(ℓ)], (9)
where θ(x) is the step-function, i.e. θ(x) = 1 for x > 0 and θ(x) = 0 otherwise§.
The model may thus be summarised as follows. At each time step ℓ a ‘state
of the world’ ω(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . ,Ω} is drawn at random. Each agent i then receives a
signal k
ω(ℓ)
i ∈ {−1, 1} corresponding to his private information structure. Given the
perceived signal he decides to invest an amount z
i,k
ω(ℓ)
i
(ℓ) ≥ 0 according to (9), based
on the propensity u
i,k
ω(ℓ)
i
(ℓ). From the investments of all agents a total price p(ℓ) is
determined via the market clearing condition (3). Each individual agent i then updates
the propensity uiσ for the perceived signal σ = k
ω(ℓ)
i according to (8), and leaves the
propensity for the opposite signal −σ unchanged.
We shall mostly be interested in the stationary state(s) of the model, and in
particular in the question of whether agents can co-ordinate efficiently even if their
access to the global signal is filtered through their private information schemes. We will
refer to ‘market efficiency’ as the situation in which returns are fully reflected by the
§ In [1] it is argued that the key features of the model remain unchanged for other choices for the
map uiσ(ℓ) = u[ziσ(ℓ)], as long as this map is increasing and guarantees limu→∞ z(u) = ∞ and
limu→−∞ z(u) = 0. In the simulations presented below the expression given in (9) was used.
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prices. In order to quantify the efficiency, or otherwise, of the market we consider the
‘squared distance’ between prices and returns in the steady state‖:
H = lim
N→∞
∑
ω
〈R(ℓ)− p(ℓ)|ω〉2 , (10)
where 〈· · · |ω〉 stands for a time-average in the steady state conditioned on the occurrence
of state ω. Phases in which prices equal returns in all states ω, and in which accordingly
H = 0 are said to be efficient, whereas phases with H 6= 0 are referred to as inefficient.
A second quantity of interest measures how differently the agents behave upon
receiving the two different signals, and is defined as follows:
q =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(〈zi+〉 − 〈zi−〉
2
)2
. (11)
Here 〈. . .〉 stands for a time-average in the stationary state. q measures the extent to
which agents use the information available to them. Small values of q indicate that the
investment they make is nearly independent of the observed signal, while the perceived
signal is strongly correlated with their trading actions for large values of q.
Before turning to the details of the further analysis, let us briefly summarise the
static picture of the model as found in [1]. For η = 0 the system undergoes a phase
transition from an efficient to an inefficient regime at a critical value αc, which depends
on the details of the disorder statistics. In the sub-critical phase at α < αc, whereH = 0,
the asymptotic value of q depends on initial conditions. For the game with sophisticated
agents (η = 1), instead, no such transition occurs and the system is inefficient for all α.
Moreover the dynamics is ergodic. Loosely writing q turns out to be larger for the game
without impact-correction than it is for η = 1. Thus, na¨ıve agents use the information
more than sophisticated ones, though the latter have larger gains.
3. Generating functional analysis
3.1. Batch dynamics
The learning rule (8) corresponds to what is known as an ‘on-line’ model in the context
of the MG [4], with an explicit dependence on ω(ℓ) at each time step ℓ. It is analytically
convenient to replace this type of updating scheme by one in which an effective average
over all values of ω(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . , αN} is carried out at every time step, as in MGs [4].
The resulting ‘batch’ model roughly describes a situation in which propensity updates
are performed only once every O(Ω) time steps, and is defined by
uiσ(ℓ+ 1) = uiσ(ℓ) +
Γ
Ω
Ω∑
ω=1
δσ,kω
i
[
Rω − pω(ℓ)− η
N
ziσ(ℓ)
]
, (12)
‖ It will turn out that 〈R(ℓ)− p(ℓ)|ω〉 = O(N−1/2), so that H as defined above is indeed of order one.
This is observed in numerical simulations, but will also become manifest in the course of the generating
functional analysis presented below.
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Figure 1. Order parameters q and H/α vs. α at fixed R = Γ = λ = 1 for the batch
and on-line games (η = 0), for different initial conditions, uiσ(0) = σu0 for all i. Open
symbols are results from simulations of the on-line game, solid symbols correspond to
the batch process. Numerical simulations are performed at αN2 = 104 and all data are
averages over 100 samples of the disorder. Measurements are taken over 5 · 104 steps
in the on-line and 7500 steps in the batch games, respectively, preceded by 15 · 104
equilibration steps in the on-line case, and 22500 equilibration steps for the batch
dynamics.
where now the price at round ℓ is effectively a vector of prices, {pω(ℓ)}, one for each state
ω: Npω(ℓ) =
∑
i zi,kωi (ℓ). This modification has turned out to have little effect on the
steady state properties of conventional MGs [11], but carries the advantage of simplifying
the analytical theory considerably. Numerical results confirm that the batch and on-line
versions of the present model are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar as far as
the order parameters q and H and the breakdown of ergodicity at αc are concerned, see
Fig. 1. Notice that in the present batch model the learning rate Γ effectively fixes a
time-scale, it also has a subtle influence on transients. It is convenient to introduce the
variables
xi(ℓ) =
1
2
∑
σ∈{−1,1}
ziσ(ℓ), yi(ℓ) =
1
2
∑
σ∈{−1,1}
σziσ(ℓ), (13)
in terms of which one has ziσ(ℓ) = xi(ℓ) + σyi(ℓ), and
uiσ(ℓ+ 1) = uiσ(ℓ) +
Γ
Ω
∑
ω
δσ,kω
i
[
R− 1
N
∑
j
xj(ℓ)
]
− Γη
ΩN
∑
ω
δσ,kω
i
ziσ(ℓ)
+
Γ
Ω
√
N
∑
ω
δσ,kω
i
[
R˜ω − 1√
N
∑
j
kωj yj(ℓ)
]
+ hiσ(ℓ), (14)
where we have introduced external perturbation fields {hiσ(ℓ)} which will be used later
in order to generate response functions. While the dynamics of the MG with S = 2
strategies per player can be written in terms of one degree of freedom per agent (the
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so-called score difference), no such simplification can be made in the present game and
we have to keep both the {xi(ℓ)} and the {yi(ℓ)}. Writing δττ ′ = (1 + ττ ′)/2 for τ, τ ∈
{−1, 1}, (14) can be simplified further using the facts that limΩ→∞(1/Ω)
∑
ω R˜
ω = 0
and limΩ→∞(1/Ω)
∑
ω δσ,kωi = 1/2. Subsequently, one may re-scale time to arrive at
uiσ(t + 1) = uiσ(t) +
Γ
N
∑
ω
δσ,kω
i
∑
j
[
R− xj(t)
]
+
Γσ
2
√
N
∑
ω
kωi R˜
ω − 1
2
Γηαziσ(t)
− Γ
N
∑
ω
δσ,kω
i
∑
j
kωj yj(t) + hiσ(t), (15)
where t is now a re-scaled time. (15) is the process we shall consider.
3.2. The effective-agent process
The aim of every dynamical theory of disordered systems is to derive a closed set of
equations for the behavior of macroscopic correlation and response functions in the limit
N → ∞. We apply the path-integral method first devised for systems with quenched
disorder by De Dominicis [9]. This technique is based on the computation of the moment
generating functional
Z[ψ] =
〈〈
exp
[
i
∑
i,σ,t
ψiσ(t)ziσ(t)
]〉〉
=
∫
Du p(u(0)) exp
[
i
∑
i,σ,t
ψiσ(t)ziσ(t)
]∏
t,σ,i
δ [equation (15)] , (16)
where ψ = (ψ−,ψ+) are generating source fields and where 〈〈· · ·〉〉 denotes an average
over the process (14) with respect to the distribution p(u(0)) of initial conditions
u(0) = {uiσ(0)} from which the dynamics is started. The shorthand Du stands
for
∏
t,σ,i
[
duiσ(t)/
√
2π
]
. Correlation and response functions can be obtained by
taking derivatives of the disorder-averaged generating functional Z[ψ] with respect to
the source fields {ψiσ(t)} and/or the perturbing fields {hiσ(t)} and by subsequently
considering the limit of vanishing fields. Our ultimate goal is to obtain self-consistent
equations for these physically relevant observables in the limit N →∞.
The calculation can be performed along the following lines. First, one expresses
the δ-distributions in (16) in their exponential representation (we denote the conjugate
parameters of the {uiσ(t)} by {ûiσ(t)}). Next, the average over the quenched disorder
{R} and {ki} is evaluated. This is done conveniently by introducing the parameters
aω(t) =
1√
N
∑
i
yi(t)k
ω
i , b
ω(t) =
1√
N
∑
i
wi(t)k
ω
i , (17)
where yi(t) is given by (13) while wi(t) stands for
wi(t) =
1
2
∑
σ∈{−1,1}
σûiσ(t). (18)
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As usual, disorder-averaging generates macroscopic objects (dynamical order
parameters). In the present problem, they are given by
m(t) =
1√
N
∑
i
[
R − xi(t)
]
, ϕ(t) =
1
2
√
N
∑
i,σ
ûiσ(t),
Q(t, t′) =
1
N
∑
i
yi(t)yi(t
′), L(t, t′) =
1
N
∑
i
wi(t)wi(t
′), (19)
K(t, t′) =
1
N
∑
i
yi(t)wi(t
′).
These definitions can again be inserted into Z[ψ] via δ-distributions. Finally, factorising
the resulting expression over agents and states wherever possible one arrives at the
familiar form
Z[ψ] =
∫
eN(Ψ+Φ+Υ)+O(
√
N)DQDQ̂DKDK̂DLDL̂DmDm̂DϕDϕ̂. (20)
The functions Ψ ≡ Ψ(m,ϕ,Q, Q̂,L, L̂,K, K̂), Φ ≡ Φ(m,ϕ,Q,L,K) and Υ ≡
Υ(m̂, ϕ̂, Q̂, L̂, K̂) are given respectively by
Ψ = i
∑
t,t′
[
Q(t, t′)Q̂(t, t′) + L(t, t′)L̂(t, t′) +K(t, t′)K̂(t, t′)
]
− iΓα
∑
t
m(t)ϕ(t), (21)
Φ = α log
∫
DaDâDbDb̂ exp
[
S(a, â, b, b̂)
]
, (22)
Υ =
1
N
∑
i
log
∫
DuDû
[∏
σ
pσ(uσ(0))
]
exp
[
i
∑
t,σ
ψiσ(t)zσ(t)− i
∑
t
m̂(t)
[
R− x(t)]]
× exp
[
−i
∑
t,t′
[
Q̂(t, t′)y(t)y(t′) + L̂(t, t′)w(t)w(t′) + K̂(t, t′)y(t)w(t′)
]]
× exp
[
i
∑
t,σ
ûσ(t)
[
uσ(t+ 1)− uσ(t)− hiσ(t) + 1
2
ϕ̂(t) +
1
2
Γηαzσ(t)
]]
,(23)
with the shorthands Da =
∏
t
[
da(t)/
√
2π
]
(and similarly for Dâ, Db, Db̂) and
Du =
[∏
t,σ duσ(t)/
√
2π
]
(and similarly for Dû), and
S(a, â, b, b̂) = i
∑
t
[
a(t)â(t) + b(t)̂b(t) + Γa(t)[b(t) + ϕ(t)]− Γb(t)m(t)
]
−1
2
∑
t,t′
[
Q(t, t′)â(t)â(t′) + L(t, t′)̂b(t)̂b(t′) + 2K(t, t′)â(t)̂b(t′)
]
−Γ
2λ2
2
∑
t,t′
b(t)b(t′). (24)
Note that we have assumed that the distribution of initial conditions factorizes over
agents and the index σ and that the distribution of the starting points is identical for all
agents, so that p(u(0)) =
∏
iσ pσ(uiσ(0)). The integrals in (20) can then be performed
by the method of steepest descents in the limit N → ∞. The dominant contributions
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here come from terms of order N in the exponent, and are contained in Ψ, Φ and Υ
as given above. All terms of sub-leading order carry zero weight in the thermodynamic
limit. The saddle-point conditions can then be worked out by taking derivatives of the
exponent in (20) with respect to the integration variables. Differentiation with respect
to m̂ and ϕ̂ leads to the relations〈
x(t)− R〉
⋆
= 0 ⇒ 1
2
∑
σ
〈zσ(t)〉⋆ = R, (25)∑
σ
〈uˆσ(t)〉⋆ = 0, (26)
where 〈· · ·〉⋆ denotes an average with respect to the probability measure defined by the
single-agent process described by Υ:
〈· · ·〉⋆ =
∫
DuDû [
∏
σ pσ(uσ(0))] · · ·M(u, û) e−i
∑
t
m̂(t)[R−x(t)]∫
DuDû [
∏
σ pσ(uσ(0))]M(u, û) e
−i∑
t
m̂(t)[R−x(t)]
, (27)
M(u, û) = exp
[
−i
∑
t,t′
[
Q̂(t, t′)y(t)y(t′) + L̂(t, t′)w(t)w(t′) + K̂(t, t′)y(t)w(t′)
]]
× exp
[
i
∑
t,σ
ûσ(t)
[
uσ(t+ 1)− uσ(t)− hσ(t) + 1
2
ϕ̂(t) +
1
2
Γηαzσ(t)
]]
.(28)
All order parameters appearing in this measure take their saddle-point values and the
auxiliary fields ψ have been set to zero; also, we assumed hiσ(t) = hσ(t) for all i. Notice
that (25) implies that the average investment equals R. We will henceforth set m̂ = 0
and use (25) as an additional condition to be satisfied by the solutions. As for ϕ̂, its
physical meaning and value will become clear when the steady state will be worked out
explicitly in the next section. The saddle-point conditions for m and ϕ read
m(t) = 〈a(t)〉Φ , ϕ(t) = −〈b(t)〉Φ , (29)
where
〈· · ·〉Φ =
∫ · · · exp [S(a, â, b, b̂)]DaDâDbDb̂∫
exp
[
S(a, â, b, b̂)
]
DaDâDbDb̂
. (30)
These two equations admit the self-consistent solution m = ϕ = 0, the integrals
vanishing due to symmetry.
It remains to compute the saddle-point values of the order parameters {Q,L,K}
and of their conjugates {Q̂, K̂, L̂}. Extremisation of the exponent in (20) with respect
to {Q̂, K̂, L̂} gives
Q(t, t′) = 〈y(t)y(t′)〉⋆ =
1
4
∑
σ,τ
στ 〈zσ(t)zτ (t′)〉⋆ , (31)
L(t, t′) = 〈w(t)w(t′)〉⋆ =
1
4
∑
σ,τ
στ 〈ûσ(t)ûτ (t′)〉⋆ , (32)
K(t, t′) = 〈y(t)w(t′)〉⋆ =
1
4
∑
σ,τ
στ 〈zσ(t)ûτ (t′)〉⋆ . (33)
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By taking derivatives of the generating functional with respect to the fields {ψ,h} one
may check that Q and K can be identified with correlation and response functions of
the original multi-agent system
Q(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈〈yi(t)yi(t′)〉〉, (34)
K(t, t′) = i lim
N→∞
1
2N
N∑
i=1
∑
τ∈{−1,1}
τ
∂〈〈yi(t)〉〉
∂hiτ (t′)
. (35)
L vanishes identically by virtue of the built-in normalization Z[0] = 1 (see [11]). Finally,
the saddle-point equations corresponding to the integrations over {Q,L,K} read
Q̂(t, t′) = i
∂Φ
∂Q(t, t′)
, L̂(t, t′) = i
∂Φ
∂L(t, t′)
, K̂(t, t′) = i
∂Φ
∂K(t, t′)
. (36)
Φ can be evaluated explicitly by successively integrating (22) over the {a(t)}, {â(t)}
and {b(t)}. Taking the required derivatives one finds that
Q̂ = 0, L̂ = − i
2
αΛ, K̂
T
= −αΓ (1− iΓK)−1 , (37)
where
Λ = (1− iΓK)−1D (1− iΓKT )−1 , (38)
D(t, t′) = Γ2
[
λ2 +Q(t, t′)
]
. (39)
Motivated by (35), we shall henceforth set G = −iK . Inserting the saddle-point
conditions into (28) leads to the effective-agent process
uσ(t + 1) = uσ(t) + hσ(t)− 1
2
ϕ̂(t)− αΓσ
2
∑
t′≤t
(1+ ΓG)−1(t, t′)y(t′)
− 1
2
Γηαzσ(t) +
√
α
2
σξ(t), (40)
where σ ∈ {−1, 1} and zσ(t) = uσ(t)θ[uσ(t)], while ξ(t) is a zero-average Gaussian noise
with temporal correlations given by the covariance matrix
〈ξ(t)ξ(t′)〉 = Λ(t, t′). (41)
Note that the representative agent is here described by a pair of processes, uσ(t),
σ ∈ {−1, 1} at variance with the versions of the MG studied so far, where one has
only process (for the so-called score difference). The one-time function ϕ̂ and the two-
time functions Q and G are the dynamical order parameters of the problem, to be
determined self-consistently according to (31) and (33), where the average 〈· · ·〉⋆ is over
the effective process (40), i.e. over realisations of {ξ(t)}, subject to the constraint (25).
As usual, the resulting self-consistent effective agent problem is fully equivalent to the
original coupled N -particle dynamics in the thermodynamic limit N →∞ in the sense
that Q and G are the correlation and response functions of the original batch problem.
The non-trivial correlation structure of the single-particle noise and the non-Markovian
term coupling to times t′ ≤ t in the effective process (40) are direct consequences of
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the presence of quenched disorder in the original multi-agent system, and impede a full
analytical solution for the dynamical order parameters at all times. For models of the
present type the alternative numerical iteration scheme provided by [12] is restricted
to O(102) time steps due to computational limitations. In our case equilibration times
turn out to be much larger. Note that the constraint 〈x(t)〉⋆ = R (for all times t) is not
an external one as for example in spherical models [13], but rather it is self-generated
by the system in the thermodynamic limit. For this reason ϕ̂ has no direct analogue in
the original N -particle problem, but appears only in the effective process.
3.3. Average price/return fluctuations
The fluctuations of the difference between price and return are given by
d(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
N〈〈[R(t)− p(t)][R(t′)− p(t′)]〉〉 (42)
(note that the above quantity with the explicit pre-factor N turns out to be of order
one). This is equivalent to
d(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
1
Ω
∑
ω
〈〈[
m(t) + R˜ω − aω(t)
] [
m(t′) + R˜ω − aω(t′)
]〉〉
, (43)
where we made use of (17). Proceeding as before and integrating by parts over bω(t)
one sees that
d(t, t′) = lim
N→∞
1
ΩΓ2
∑
ω
〈〈
b̂ω(t)̂bω(t′)
〉〉
. (44)
Anticipating that in the limit N →∞ the behavior of d(t, t′) will be dominated by the
same saddle-point describing 〈〈Z[ψ]〉〉 and at which m = ϕ = 0 we have
d(t, t′) =
1
Γ2
∫
DQDQ̂DKDK̂DLDL̂Dm̂Dϕ̂ eN(Ψ+Υ)+(Ω−1)Φ/α+O(
√
N)
×
∫
DaDâDbDb̂ b̂(t)̂b(t′) exp
[
i
∑
t
[
a(t)â(t) + b(t)̂b(t) + Γa(t)b(t)
]]
(45)
× exp
[
−1
2
∑
t,t′
[
Γ2λ2b(t)b(t′) +Q(t, t′)â(t)â(t′) + 2K(t, t′)â(t)̂b(t′)
]]
.
Integrating over a, â and b we find
d(t, t′) = Λ(t, t′)/Γ2 =
[
(1+ ΓG)−1(λ2E +Q)(1+ ΓGT )−1
]
(t, t′), (46)
so that indeed d(t, t′) as defined above is of order one. E is the matrix with all entries
equal to one.
Following similar steps one can calculate the average price-return difference, namely
A(t) = lim
N→∞
√
N 〈〈[R(t)− p(t)]〉〉. (47)
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One finds
A(t) =
1
Γ
∫
DQDQ̂DKDK̂DLDL̂Dm̂Dϕ̂ eN(Ψ+Υ)+(Ω−1)Φ/α+O(
√
N)
∫
DaDâDbDb̂ b̂(t) exp
[
i
∑
t
[
a(t)â(t) + b(t)̂b(t) + Γa(t)b(t)
]]
(48)
× exp
[
−1
2
∑
t,t′
[
Γ2λ2b(t)b(t′) +Q(t, t′)â(t)â(t′) + 2K(t, t′)â(t)̂b(t′)
]]
.
This integral vanishes due to symmetry, hence A(t) is a zero-average process with
temporal correlations d(t, t′) of order one.
4. Ergodic steady states
4.1. General considerations
Due to the presence of the coloured noise ξ(t) and of the retarded self-interaction in the
effective process (40) it is in general not feasible to solve the self-consistent system
{(25),(31),(33)} analytically for all times t, t′. We shall therefore restrict ourselves
to studying the ergodic steady states of the effective-agent problem. These are time-
translation invariant solutions,
lim
t→∞
Q(t + τ, t) = Q(τ), lim
t→∞
G(t + τ, t) = G(τ), lim
t→∞
ϕ̂(t) = ϕ, (49)
without long-term memory,
lim
t→∞
G(t, t′) = 0 ∀t′ finite, (50)
and with finite integrated response,
lim
t→∞
∑
τ≤t
G(τ) =: χ <∞. (51)
With these Ansa¨tze one performs a time-average of the effective process (40), leading
to
u˜σ = −1
2
ϕ− 1
2
Γηαzσ − αΓσ/2
1 + Γχ
y +
√
α
2
σξ. (52)
Here, we have introduced u˜σ = limt→∞ uσ(t)/t (roughly representing the ‘velocity’ with
which the propensities grow in time), as well as the static variables
zσ = lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
t′≤t
zσ(t
′), y = lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
t′≤t
y(t′), ξ = lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
t′≤t
ξ(t′). (53)
hσ(t) has been set to zero. Note that ξ is (static) Gaussian noise of zero mean and
variance 〈
ξ2
〉
=
Γ2 (λ2 + q)
(1 + Γχ)2
, (54)
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and that the zσ, σ ∈ {−1, 1} as well as y are stochastic variables, coupled to the value
of ξ via Eq. (52). The parameter
q = lim
t→∞
1
t
∑
τ≤t
Q(τ) (55)
represents the persistent part of the correlation function which, together with χ and ϕ,
is to be determined self-consistently from
〈x〉 = R, q = 〈y2〉 , χ = 1√
α
〈
∂y
∂ξ
〉
. (56)
Note that, up to a pre-factor, the noise acts effectively as an external field, so that χ
can be expressed in terms of a derivative with respect to ξ. Recalling (13) one realises
that q is indeed the observable defined in (11).
In the stationary state the matrix d(t, t′) will also be time-translation invariant,
and similar to the MG one finds
H = α lim
τ→∞
d(τ) = α
λ2 + q
(1 + Γχ)2
. (57)
The magnitude of the fluctuations of the price around its temporal mean is given by
δp2 ≡ α−1
∑
ω
〈
(p− 〈p|ω〉)2|ω〉 = d(τ = 0)−H/α. (58)
For this quantity one has the exact relation
δp2 =
[
(1+ ΓG)−1(λ2E +Q)(1+ ΓGT )−1
]
(0)−H/α. (59)
A further evaluation of δp2 hence requires in principle the full knowledge of the transient
contributions to the correlation and response functions. While the analogous quantity
in the MG can be well approximated in terms of persistent order parameters, such an
estimate appears much more subtle here due to an explicit dependence of the fluctuations
on the learning rate. Defining Q˜(t, t′) = Q(t, t′)− q one has
δp2 =
[
(1+ ΓG)−1Q˜(1+ ΓGT )−1
]
(0), (60)
where Q˜ is a measure of the fluctuations of the variables yi(t) around their temporal
averages, and depends on the learning rate. For Γ → 0 no fluctuations are present, so
that δp2 → 0, as pointed out in [1]. In general, the right-hand-side is an increasing
function of Γ, which is difficult to express in terms of persistent order parameters within
the present setup. We choose here to focus on the asymptotics of the model.
In order to proceed with the analysis of (52) one inspects the behaviour of the
{uiσ(t)} in numerical simulations, and formulates suitable Ansa¨tze for u˜σ, corresponding
to different types of solutions observed in simulations. For purposes of clarity, we will
treat the cases η = 0 and η > 0 separately in the following.
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Figure 2. Phase diagram of the model without impact-correction. Solid line indicates
the ergodic/non-ergodic (NE) transition at αc, given by Eq. (71), dashed line is the
transition between the 2- and the 1 + 0-phases at α⋆, see Eq. (70).
4.2. η = 0
Simulations of the model without impact-correction reveal the existence of three distinct
phases, two ergodic ones and a third with anomalous response:
• For large α greater than a critical value α⋆ both propensities uiσ are positive
on average and remain finite in the steady state for all agents. Each agent
asymptotically invests finite amounts under both signals. The corresponding
effective agent has u˜σ = 0 for both σ ∈ {−1, 1}. We shall refer to this phase
as the ‘2-phase’, indicating that all agents invest under both signals.
• For intermediate α agents are divided into two groups. Some agents do not invest
under either signal, both of their propensities decrease linearly with time, so that
u˜σ < 0 for both σ ∈ {−1, 1}. Each of the remaining agents invest under one signal
(say σi for player i) but not under the opposite signal −σi. For such agents, the
propensity uiσi(t) is positive and remains finite asymptotically, while the other one
decreases linearly in time. This corresponds to trajectories of the effective process
with u˜σ = 0 for one value σ ∈ {−1, 1} and u˜−σ < 0. We will refer to this phase
as the ‘1 + 0-phase’, indicating that some players do not invest under either signal,
while others invest under precisely one signal.
• For low α less than a critical value αc one finds that the macroscopic order
parameters of the steady state depend on initial conditions, see Fig. 1. Hence
the dynamics is non-ergodic, and we expect the integrated response χ to be infinite
in this regime. We will label this phase by NE (non-ergodic) in the following.
It will turn out that the relevant control parameters for the phase behaviour of the
model are given by α and the ratio λ/R of the mean return over its standard deviation,
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the learning rate Γ has no influence on the persistent order parameters in the stationary
states, but only on the transients of the dynamics. The resulting phase diagram in the
(α, λ/R)-plane is depicted in Fig. 2
We will now study the two ergodic phases separately, starting with the phase at
intermediate values of α, and will compute the persistent order parameters in the two
ergodic phases, as well as the boundaries α⋆ and αc separating the three regimes.
4.2.1. The 1+0 phase at intermediate α Agents who do not invest under either signal
correspond to solutions of the effective agent process with
u˜σ = −uσ < 0, zσ = y = 0, σ ∈ {−1, 1}. (61)
While the specific values of the uσ, σ ∈ {−1, 1} will play no role for the further analysis,
we would like to stress that different realisations of the effective process (that is different
realisations of the noise ξ) can in general lead to different values for the uσ, σ ∈ {−1, 1}
and for the zσ. For agents who invest under one signal, but not under the other, we will
inspect solutions of the effective process of the following two types:
(u˜+, u˜−) = (0,−u) (z+, z−) = (2y, 0) y > 0, (62)
(u˜+, u˜−) = (−u, 0) (z+, z−) = (0,−2y) y < 0. (63)
The former corresponds to agents who invest under signal σ = 1, the latter to agents
who play upon receiving σ = −1. In both cases, u takes a positive value, which again
in principle may vary for different realisations of the effective process. In either case
summing the two relations (52) (with η = 0) leads to
u = ϕ. (64)
In particular u takes the same value for all (effective) agents who invest under exactly
one signal. Self-consistency demands ϕ > 0 as we have assumed above that u is positive.
Taking the difference of the two equations of (52) we find
αΓ|y|
1 + Γχ
= −ϕ±√αξ, (65)
where the plus signs describes the case y > 0 while the minus sign holds when y < 0.
Setting ξ⋆ = ϕ/
√
α one sees that the former case is realized when ξ > ξ⋆, the latter when
ξ < −ξ⋆. For |ξ| < ξ⋆ no solution with |y| > 0 is possible and the corresponding effective
agent never invests, as discussed above. We conclude that the physical interpretation
of ϕ is closely related to the relative weight of the two types of agents. Indeed, the
probability that an agent is inactive, that is the fraction of agents who do not invest
under either signal, is given by
φ0 = 〈θ (ξ⋆ − |ξ|)〉 = erf
(
ϕ√
2αγ
)
, (66)
where γ = 〈ξ2〉, see (54). The persistent order parameters ϕ, q and χ are obtained from
the self-consistency relations〈
z+ + z−
2
〉
= R, q =
〈
y2
〉
, χ =
1√
α
〈
∂y
∂ξ
〉
, (67)
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which may be written as
ΓR
√
α
1 + Γχ
= 〈(ξ − ξ⋆)θ(ξ − ξ⋆)〉+ 〈(−ξ − ξ⋆)θ(−ξ − ξ⋆)〉 ,
αΓq
(1 + Γχ)2
=
〈
(ξ − ξ⋆)2θ(ξ − ξ⋆)〉+ 〈(−ξ − ξ⋆)2θ(−ξ − ξ⋆)〉 , (68)
αΓχ
1 + Γχ
= 〈θ(ξ − ξ⋆)〉+ 〈θ(−ξ − ξ⋆)〉 .
After carrying out the remaining integrations over ξ one finds
ΓR
1 + Γχ
= 2
√
γ
2πα
exp
(
− ϕ
2
2αγ
)
− ϕ
α
erfc
(
ϕ√
2αγ
)
,
αΓ2q
(1 + Γχ)2
=
(
γ +
ϕ2
α
)
erfc
(
ϕ√
2αγ
)
− 2ϕ
√
γ
2πα
exp
(
− ϕ
2
2αγ
)
, (69)
αΓχ
1 + Γχ
= 1− erf
(
ϕ√
2αγ
)
.
This coupled system of non-linear equations is easily solved numerically (for example
using Newton-Raphson methods), and the order parameters q, χ and ϕ may be
obtained as functions of α for any fixed values of the model parameters R, λ and
Γ. The dependence of these persistent order parameters on the learning rate Γ can be
understood by an inspection of (69). One finds that the solution is Γ-independent when
expressed in terms of the re-scaled variables {q,Γχ, ϕ/Γ}. H can in turn be obtained
from (57).
This solution is valid self-consistently as long as χ turns out to be finite, and as
long as ϕ comes out positive. The point at which the latter condition breaks down is
easily determined upon setting ϕ = 0 in the above coupled set of equations. After some
algebra one finds that this occurs at
α = α⋆ = 1 +
2
π
λ2
R
2 , (70)
which coincides with the static result [1]. The onset of anomalous response, i.e. the
point αc at which χ diverges at fixed values of λ, Γ and R is found to be determined by
the condition¶
αc = 1− φ0(αc). (71)
αc is obtained as αc = erfc(ζc) where ζc is the root of
R
λ
=
e−ζ
2
/
√
π − ζerfc(ζ)√
ζe−ζ2/
√
π − ζ2erfc(ζ) . (72)
Note that due to Eq. (57) H vanishes at the point of diverging χ. Hence the
dynamical phase transition between the ergodic and non-ergodic regimes coincides with
the transition between efficient (H = 0) and non-efficient (H > 0) phases observed
¶ Note that a very similar condition αc = 1 − φ(αc) has been found in the context of the Minority
Game [11]. There, φ denotes the fraction of so-called frozen agents.
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in [1]. One finds numerically that αc < α
⋆ for all fixed values of the parameters λ,Γ, R,
so that we conclude that the 1 + 0-phase is physically realised for intermediate values
of α ∈ [αc, α⋆].
4.2.2. The 2-phase at α > α⋆. Here we set u˜σ = 0 for both σ ∈ {−1, 1} in (52).
Summing the resulting expressions for σ = 1 and σ = −1 one immediately finds ϕ = 0
for η = 0. Taking the difference, instead, yields
yΓ
√
α
1 + Γχ
= ξ. (73)
This in turn implies that
q =
〈
y2
〉
=
〈ξ2〉 (1 + Γχ)2
αΓ2
=
λ2 + q
α
, (74)
from which we can directly read off the value of q in the 2-phase:
q =
λ2
α− 1 , (75)
in agreement with the corresponding static result given in [1]. For the susceptibility one
obtains
χ =
1√
α
〈
∂y
∂ξ
〉
=
1
Γ(α− 1) . (76)
Eqs. (75) and (76) along with our result ϕ = 0 completely describe the persistent order
parameters in the ergodic steady states at α > α⋆. Note that α⋆ > 1 by virtue of (70),
so that no singularities occur in the 2-phase. Using Eq. (57) H is given by
H = λ2(α− 1) (77)
for α > α⋆.
4.2.3. Comparison with simulations We have tested our theoretical predictions for
the game without impact-correction against numerical simulations. Results for H and
q are presented in Fig. 3, while Fig. 4 shows the behaviour of φ0. All simulations
are performed on the on-line update rules (given by Eq. (8)) with αN2 = 104.
Measurements are taken over 50000 time-steps preceded by 150000 equilibration steps.
All data presented are averages over 100 samples of the disorder. The learning rate is
kept fixed at Γ = 1 (we have verified the independence of q and H of the learning rate in
separate simulations). The figures demonstrate very good agreement of the theoretical
predictions with the numerical data, modulo finite-size effects close to the transition
points. We observe that q is a decreasing function of α in the two ergodic phases, with a
cusp at the transition point between the 1+0- and the 2-phase at α = α⋆. The breakdown
of ergodicity below αc can be illustrated by starting the dynamics from differently biased
initial propensities. While the macroscopic order parameter q is insensitive to initial
conditions above αc, the starting point becomes relevant in the non-ergodic phase, as
shown in Fig. 1.
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Figure 3. Order parameters q and H/α as functions of α for fixed η = 0. Markers are
from simulations of the on-line model for λ = 0.5 (circles), λ = 1 (squares) and λ = 2
(diamonds), started from unbiased initial conditions. We set Γ = 1 for all three curves.
The solid lines are the predictions of the analytical theory and have been continued
as dashed lines into phases where they are no longer valid. The vertical lines indicate
the analytically obtained locations of the ergodic/non-ergodic phase transition at αc
for the three different values of λ = 0.5, 1, 2 (from right to left).
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Figure 4. Fraction φ0 of agents who do not invest under either signal for fixed η = 0.
Markers are from simulations of the on-line model for λ = 0.5 (circles), λ = 1 (squares)
and λ = 2 (diamonds), started from unbiased initial conditions. We set Γ = 1 for all
three curves. The solid lines are the predictions of the analytical theory in the phase
of intermediate α. Outside this phase φ0 is predicted to be zero. The vertical lines
indicate the analytically obtained locations of the ergodic/non-ergodic phase transition
at αc for the three different values of λ = 0.5, 1, 2 (from right to left).
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4.3. η > 0
For η > 0 the situation is slightly more complicated. One observes at all α that agents
are divided in two classes: those who trade under both signals and those who trade at
most under one signal. Let us discuss this scenario in detail. The former have
u˜σ = 0, zσ > 0, σ ∈ {−1, 1}. (78)
Notice that for these agents x = (z+ + z−)/2 > |y| = |(z+ − z−)/2|. For the latter one
has instead (62) and (63) as before. For them, x = y when y > 0 and x = −y when
y < 0.
Let us start with the traders who always invest. Summing equations (52) with
non-zero η and u˜σ = 0 one gets
ϕ = −Γηαx, (79)
whereas taking the difference gives
y =
ξ
√
αΓ
(
η + 1
1+Γχ
) . (80)
The requirement |y| < x now translates into the condition
|ξ| < − ϕ
η
√
α
(
η +
1
1 + Γχ
)
(81)
on the effective noise. Note that ϕ < 0 by virtue of (79). Turning to agents who trade
under one signal only, summing equations (52) with non-zero η one finds that (64) and
(65) generalize to
u = ϕ + Γηα|y|, (82)
αΓ|y|
(
η +
1
1 + Γχ
)
∓√αξ = −u, (83)
where the minus (resp. plus) sign holds for agents with y > 0 (resp. y < 0). Let us
focus on agents with y > 0. Combining (82) and (83) one gets
y =
−ϕ+√αξ
αΓ
(
2η + 1
1+Γχ
) . (84)
On the other hand, since u > 0 we must have
ξ >
√
αΓy
(
η +
1
1 + Γχ
)
, (85)
which via (84) becomes
ξ > − ϕ
η
√
α
(
η +
1
1 + Γχ
)
. (86)
Similarly one finds that the solution with y < 0 corresponds to
ξ <
ϕ
η
√
α
(
η +
1
1 + Γχ
)
. (87)
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Figure 5. Order parameters q and H/α for η > 0 as functions of α at fixed values of
Γ = λ = 1. Markers are from simulations of the on-line model for η = 0.05 (circles),
η = 0.25 (squares), η = 0.5 (diamonds) and η = 0.75 (triangles), started from unbiased
initial conditions. The solid lines are the predictions of the analytical theory in the
1 + 2 phase.
Hence, defining ξ = − ϕ
η
√
α
(
η + 1
1+Γχ
)
, the fraction of players who invest under both
signals can be written as
φ2 =
〈
θ(ξ − |ξ|)〉 , (88)
where 〈. . .〉 is again an average over ξ (with variance given by (54)). The saddle-point
conditions (56) take the form:
√
αΓR = − ϕ
η
√
α
〈
θ(ξ − |ξ|)〉 + 〈(ξ − ξ⋆)θ(ξ − ξ)〉− 〈(ξ + ξ⋆)θ(−ξ − ξ)〉
2η + 1/(1 + Γχ)
,
αΓ2q =
〈
ξ2θ(ξ − ξ)〉
[η + 1/(1 + Γχ)]2
+
〈
(ξ − ξ⋆)2θ(ξ − ξ)〉+ 〈(ξ + ξ⋆)2θ(−ξ − ξ)〉
[2η + 1/(1 + Γχ)]2
, (89)
αΓχ =
〈
θ(ξ − ξ)〉
η + 1/(1 + Γχ)
+
〈
θ(|ξ| − ξ)〉
2η + 1/(1 + Γχ)
,
where as before ξ⋆ = ϕ/
√
α. We do not report the lengthy expressions one obtains after
the averages over ξ are carried out, but would like to stress that one readily checks that
these equations do not allow for a diverging susceptibility at any finite α. Therefore the
model with impact-correction does not exhibit anomalous response, in contrast with the
game at η = 0. From (89) the order parameters ϕ, q and χ can be obtained numerically
as functions of α for any fixed values of η > 0, λ and Γ, and near perfect agreement is
found with numerical simulations, see Fig. 5 and 6. Observing no systematic deviations
from the theory, we have no reason to suspect an onset of long-term memory at finite
χ, and hence the physical picture of the present model at η > 0 appears different from
the behaviour of the MG with impact correction [14].
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Figure 6. Fraction φ2 of agents who invest under both signals, shown for different
values of η > 0. Markers are from simulations of the on-line model for η = 0.05
(circles), η = 0.25 (squares), η = 0.5 (diamonds) and η = 0.75 (triangles), started from
unbiased initial conditions and with Γ = 1, λ = 1. The solid lines are the predictions
of the analytical theory in the 1 + 2 phase.
5. Concluding remarks
We have presented an analysis of the dynamics of a system of adaptive agents with
private asymmetric information, complementing and extending the study of the statics
of the model previously presented in [1]. To this end we have devised a batch version of
the original on-line update rules and observe no significant effects on the persistent order
parameters in the stationary states. This demonstrates that the replacement of the on-
line dynamics by an information-averaged batch process as successfully performed in the
context of the MG can be extended to other models of interacting agents. Path integral
methods can then be used to turn the coupled batch dynamics of the N interacting
agents into an effective single-agent problem in the limit N → ∞. From this effective
process the persistent order parameters in the different ergodic stationary states as well
as the phase diagram can be computed exactly and in agreement with the static results
obtained via replica techniques. For the model without impact-correction (η = 0)
we find three different phases, two ergodic ones and a phase with broken ergodicity
and dependence of the stationary macroscopic order parameters on initial conditions.
The location of the onset of ergodicity breaking, αc, coincides with the location of the
transition between efficient and non-efficient phases identified in [1]. For sophisticated
agents (η > 0) only one phase is present, and no ergodicity breaking occurs. The
generating functional approach also allows to address the issue of (average) fluctuations
of prices around the (quenched) returns, and an exact relation to the dynamical order
parameters can be drawn. The computation of H does not require the knowledge of
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the transient contributions of the correlation and response functions, but only of their
persistent parts (which we can compute exactly). On the other hand full solutions of the
self-consistent effective problem for the functions C(τ) and G(τ) are needed to calculate
the fluctuations of p(t) around R(t). While the corresponding fluctuations in the MG
(the so-called volatility) can be well estimated in terms of persistent order parameters,
similar approximations appear to be much more delicate in the present model. In
addition we find that the volatilities of the batch and on-line models are different,
which is not is not surprising as they depend on transients in C and G. Moreover a
dependence of the magnitude of fluctuations on the learning rate has been reported
in [1]. An analytical study of this dependence is beyond the scope of the present paper;
it appears that these issues are more effectively tackled in suitably simplified versions
of the model of [1], work on which is in progress.
In conclusion the dynamical mean field theory extensively used in the context of
the MG with common public information can be extended to models of interacting
agents with asymmetric non-uniform information. The present model can up to now
presumably at best be seen as a most simplistic model of a financial market. Possible
extensions include models with heterogeneous learning rates Γi, such models are of
interest both from the mathematical point of view as they would lead to an ensemble
of effective processes similar to [15, 16], but would also allow to study the interaction
and relative success of agents with different abilities of adaptation. In the same realm
the individual wealth of the agents could be taken into account, each varying in time
according to the performance of the agents. It might also be worthwhile studying the
influence of decision noise on the phase diagram. Another presumably most interesting
extension of the model would be one in which the information available to the agents
is not only asymmetric, but also noisy. Finally, in the present model the ‘states of the
world’ ω are drawn at random at each time step. With techniques now available to
study Minority Games with real histories [4], an attempt might be made to replace this
external random signal by endogenously generated pieces of information relating to the
previous history of the market. The state ω(t) at a given time step t might for example
encode the prices p(t − 1), p(t − 2), . . . , p(t −M) of the previous M steps or relate to
the history of differences between prices and returns. Work along some of these lines is
currently in progress.
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